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A Clear Judicial Day in North Carolina-Johnson v. Ruark
Obstetrics Smooths the Way for Plaintiffs' Claims for Negligent

Infliction of Emotional Distress
"'[T]here are clear judicial days on which a court can foresee forever,' ",
and in North Carolina, such a day has arrived. In Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics &
Gynecology Associates,2 the North Carolina Supreme Court conclusively rejected
the long-held and widely followed view that a plaintiff could not recover for
negligent infliction of emotional distress absent the showing of some related
physical injury, either as a cause of the distress or as a consequence of it.3 By
way of replacement, the court decreed that "an allegation of ordinary negligence
will suffice, '4 so long as the plaintiff also "allege[s] that severe emotional distress
was the foreseeable and proximate result of such negligence." 5 By rejecting the
imposition of bright-line rules or standards, 6 the Johnson decision is the judicial
equivalent of a clean slate.
This Note chronicles the North Carolina courts' treatment of tort claims
for negligent infliction of emotional distress and examines the varying limitations and restrictions imposed by the courts in their attempts to develop workable rules. It analyzes the Johnson court's selective application of precedent and
questions both the court's disinclination to establish more specific standards regarding availability of the claim and the wisdom of dismissing several decades of
contrary case law as "erroneous." The Note then explores the potential effects
of Johnson. The Note concludes that the court should have set forth clearer
standards to better guide the trial courts in determining whether to allow the
1. Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 327 N.C. 283, 309, 395 S.E.2d 85, 100
(Meyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 668, 771 P.2d 814, 830, 257 Cal.
Rptr. 865, 881 (1989) ("with apologies to [lyricist] Bernard Witkin")).
2. 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990).
3. The court found it necessary to overrule a number of cases that "require[d] a plaintiff to
show-in addition to mental or emotional injury-a physical impact, physical injury, or a physical

manifestation of emotional distress to succeed on a claim of negligent intliction of emotional distress." Id. at 301, 395 S.E.2d at 95. The court overruled Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189
N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925), overruled on other grounds in Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial

Hosp., Inc., 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980). The court also disapproved Stanback v. Stanback,
297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979), disapproved in Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d
325 (1981); Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960); and Kimberly v. Howland,
143 N.C. 398, 55 S.E. 778 (1906), to the extent those cases implicated a physical injury requirement.
In addition, Johnson overruled seven decisions of the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The
overruled decisions were Edwards v. Advo Systems, Inc., 93 N.C. App. 154, 376 S.E.2d 765 (1989);
Ledford v. Martin, 87 N.C. App. 88, 359 S.E.2d 505 (1987), disc. rev. denied, 321 N.C. 473, 365
S.E.2d 1 (1988); Campbell ex rel McMillan v. Pitt County Memorial Hosp., Inc., 84 N.C. App. 314,
352 S.E.2d 904, aff'd on other grounds, 321 N.C. 260, 362 S.E.2d 273 (1987); Woodell v. Pinehurst
Surgical Clinic, P.A., 78 N.C. App. 230, 336 S.E.2d 716 (1985), aff'd, 316 N.C. 550, 342 S.E.2d 523
(1986) (per curiam); Craven v. Chambers, 56 N.C. App. 151, 287 S.E.2d 905 (1982); and Wesley v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 680, 268 S.E.2d 855, disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 239, 283
S.E.2d 136 (1980).
4. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 291, 395 S.E.2d at 89. The court explained that "our law includes no arbitrary requirements to be applied mechanically to claims for the negligent infliction of emotional distress."
Id.
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claim to go to a jury, and recommends different standards of recovery for directly injured victims and for bystanders. The Note proposes alternative limitations for each; specifically, the Note argues that in order to state a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, directly injured plaintiffs should be required to forecast evidence that, if believed, would support an award of punitive
damages. 7 This standard emphasizes the nature of the defendant's conduct
rather than the extent of the plaintiff's emotional injury. The Note agrees with
the Johnson court's affirmation of bystanders' ability to recover for negligently
inflicted emotional distress, but suggests that they should be permitted to do so
only in accordance with a modified version of the test recently established by the
California Supreme Court in Thing v. La Chusa.8
From March through October of 1983, expectant parent Barbara Johnson
received prenatal medical care from Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Associates, P.A.9 Mrs. Johnson's pregnancy progressed normally through the morning
of October 3, 1983;10 later that afternoon, she began experiencing contractions
and was admitted to Wake Medical Center.11 Testing undertaken at the hospital revealed the absence of any fetal heart tones, and the Johnsons were informed

of the fetal death at approximately 8:00 p.m. 12 Mrs. Johnson remained in labor

and delivered the stillborn fetus in the early hours of October 4, 1983.13

On behalf of the fetus, Glenn Johnson filed a wrongful death action against
defendants. 14 Included in the complaint were claims for negligent infliction of

emotional distress, brought by both Glenn and Barbara Johnson "in their individual capacities as father and mother of the fetus." 15 The complaint alleged, in
sum, that Mrs. Johnson's doctors negligently failed to treat Mrs. Johnson's dia-

16
betic condition properly, thereby causing the fetus to die of malnutrition.

Defendants denied any negligence and moved to dismiss for failure to state
7. See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text. A "directly injured plaintiff" is any party
who brings suit to recover for mental injury negligently inflicted upon her by the defendant.
8. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989). See infra notes 173-80 and accompanying text. Discussions of "bystander" recovery refer to recovery by a plaintiff who alleges mental
suffering brought about by the plaintiff's concern for a third party who was directly injured by
defendant's negligent conduct.
9. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 286, 395 S.E.2d at 87. Glenn and Barbara Johnson brought suit
against Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Associates, P.A. (formerly The Ruark Clinic), and against
the four individual doctors employed by the defendant who managed Mrs. Johnson's prenatal health
care program.
10. Id. at 286-87, 395 S.E.2d at 87. Mrs. Johnson reported feeling fetal movement during the
evening of October 2, 1983. Id. According to the complaint, defendant Dr. Edgerton reported the
presence of a fetal heart tone at 9:30 a.m. on October 3, 1983, when Mrs. Johnson visited The Ruark
Clinic to report contractions. Plaintiffs' Brief at 5, Johnson (No. 8610SC942).
11. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 286-87, 395 S.E.2d at 87.
12. Id. at 287, 395 S.E.2d at 87.
13. Id.
14. Id. Mr. Johnson was authorized by statute to bring the action as administrator of the fetal
estate. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984).
15. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 287, 395 S.E.2d at 87.
16. Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 89 N.C. App. 154, 156, 365 S.E.2d
909, 910 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990). The infant's death
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a claim upon which relief could be granted. 17 Defendants also requested, and
received, summary judgment as to all claims.18 The court of appeals reversed
the trial court's dismissal of both the wrongful death and the negligent infliction
of emotional distress claims.19 In so doing, the court rejected defendants' contention that North Carolina prohibits recovery for mental anguish prompted by
concern for another person. 20 The court relied on Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham
Memorial Hospital, Inc.21 to hold that "where some intimate relationships are
affected, there is no longer any absolute prohibition against compensating emotional distress damages arising from injuries to others." 22 The court recognized,
however, that availability of the claim must be tempered by the policy interest in
23
limiting negligence liability.
Having determined that the claim was not barred as a matter of law, the
court of appeals considered defendants' argument that plaintiffs still had no
standing to sue, not having suffered any physical injuries themselves. 24 Citing
Williamson v. Bennett,25 the court found that "absent some [physical] impact,
'2 6
the emotional distress claimant must manifest some resulting physical injury."
The court held that both Glenn and Barbara Johnson had alleged proper claims
because Barbara Johnson did in fact suffer physical injury and because the court
could not say as a matter of law that Glenn Johnson had not suffered physical
manifestations of his mental distress. 27
certificate listed the cause of death as "placental insufficiency." Plaintiffs' Record on Appeal to the
North Carolina Court of Appeals, Exhibit B at 10, Johnson (No. 8610SC942).
In relevant part, the complaint alleged:
Past, present and future pain and suffering and emotional distress of enduring the labor,
with the knowledge that their unborn child was dead, and the delivery of a dead child.
Past, present and future mental distress and anguish resulting from the dramatic circumstances surrounding the stillbirth of their child.
Plaintiffs' Complaint at 7, Johnson (No. 8610SC942).
17. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 287, 395 S.E.2d at 87; see N.C.R. CIv. PRO. 12(b)(6).
18. Johnson, 89 N.C. App. at 156-57, 365 S.E.2d at 911; see N.C.R. CIv. PRO. 56(e).
19. Johnson, 89 N.C. App. at 171, 365 S.E.2d at 919.
20. Id. at 163, 365 S.E.2d at 915. The defendants relied on Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C.
498, 508, 112 S.E.2d 48, 55 (1960), disapproved in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85, and Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E.2d 307 (1925), overruled on other grounds in
Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hosp., Inc., 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980), and overruled in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85.
21. 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980).
22. Johnson, 89 N.C. App. at 163, 365 S.E.2d at 915.
23. Id. at 164, 365 S.E.2d at 915. The court explained that the policy issues involved generally
relate to questions of remoteness and proximate cause. Id. According to the court, "the definition of
proximate cause necessarily includes ... whether the tort-feasor's liability should as a matter of
public policy extend to [the] injuries." Id.
24. Id. at 162, 365 S.E.2d at 914.
25. 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960), disapprovedin Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85.
In Williamson the North Carolina Supreme Court held that "[it is almost the universal opinion that
recovery may be had for mental or emotional disturbance in ordinary negligence cases where, coincident in time and place with the occurrence producing the mental stress, some actual physical impact
or genuine physical injury also resulted directly from defendant's negligence." Id. at 503, 112 S.E.2d
at 52.
26. Johnson, 89 N.C. App. at 165, 365 S.E.2d at 916.
27. Id. Barbara Johnson alleged two physical injuries, the first resulting from the negligent
treatment of her diabetes and the second resulting from the injury to the fetus; the court observed
that since "the fetus is normally attached to the mother's uterine wall, we fail to see how a physical
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The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' reinstatement of the Johnsons' claims, albeit on very different grounds. 28 Writing for the
majority, Justice Mitchell described the physical injury requirement as a miscategorization of North Carolina law and acknowledged that "varying and at times
inconsistent analyses used by our courts have apparently buttressed such misconceptions." 2 9 Overruling or disapproving a number of North Carolina cases
that had included such a requirement, 30 the court held that "neither a physical
impact, a physical injury, nor a subsequent physical manifestation of emotional
'31
distress is an element of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress.
In its review of the tort's "long and winding history in every state," 32 in-

cluding North Carolina, the court considered the theories at work in other jurisdictions. The court resolved, however, to base any final conclusions exclusively
on North Carolina law.33 To state a valid claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the court concluded that "a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant negligently engaged in conduct, (2) it was reasonably foreseeable 34 that

such conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress (often referred
to as mental anguish), and (3) the conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff severe
emotional distress."'35 Thus, the North Carolina courts' treatment of such tradi-

tional concepts as foreseeability and proximate cause drew much of the Johnson
court's attention. The application of these concepts, the court said, "must be
determined under all the facts presented, and should be resolved on a case-by'36
case basis by the trial court and, where appropriate, by a jury."
The court drew a distinction between mere "fright," which by itself is not
compensable, 37 and "severe emotional distress," for which a plaintiff might reimpact or injury to the fetus would not normally be an injury or impact to the mother." Id. at 167,
365 S.E.2d at 917.
Regarding Glenn Johnson's claim, the court concluded that the pleadings revealed no facts that
would necessarily "prohibit him from later more specifically forecasting or introducing evidence that
his alleged mental distress resulted in the necessary physical injury." Id. at 168-69, 365 S.E.2d at
918.
28. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 286, 395 S.E.2d at 86-87.
29. Id. at 291, 395 S.E.2d at 89.
30. See cases cited supra note 3.
31. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
32. Id. at 288, 395 S.E.2d at 88.
33. The dissent characterized as error the majority's reluctance to "[seek] guidance from the
experience of other jurisdictions with less expansive doctrines of recovery." Id. at 308, 395 S.E.2d at
99 (Meyer, J., dissenting). For a survey of several other jurisdictions' attempts to define the required
elements of the tort, see cases cited infra note 59.
34. The differing interpretations of "foreseeability" and its usefulness as a restrictive aspect of
the claim are discussed thoroughly by the court and debated vigorously in Justice Meyer's dissent.
For a summary of Justice Meyer's concerns, see infra notes 43-62 and accompanying text. For a
collection of foreseeability standards applied by other jurisdictions, see infra note 59.
35. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
36. Id. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98 (citing Kanoy v. Hinshaw, 273 N.C. 418, 160 S.E.2d 296
(1968); Toone v. Adams, 262 N.C. 403, 137 S.E.2d 132 (1964)).
37. Id. at 303.04, 395 S.E.2d at 97. This restriction is consistent with the court's prior holdings, reviewed in detail by the majority. Id. at 294, 395 S.E.2d at 91-92. For example, in Kimberly
v. Howland, 143 N.C. 399, 403, 55 S.E. 778, 780 (1906), the court observed that "[a]ll the courts

agree that mere fright, unaccompanied by or followed by physical injury, cannot be considered as an
element of damage." Although the Kimberly statement was dictum because the plaintiff had suffered contemporaneous physical injury, later cases often cited it. See, e.g., Williamson v. Bennett,
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cover. 38 The court recognized that severe emotional distress could encompass a
wide range of disorders so long as the condition alleged by the plaintiff was of a
39
sort generally recognized as a genuine disorder by trained medical personnel.
4°
The Johnson court rejected any requirement of heightened negligence.
The court also established identical standards for the plaintiff who brings an
action based upon a mental or emotional injury infficted directly upon him by
the defendant, and for the "bystander" plaintiff who alleges mental suffering
brought about by the plaintiff's concern for another party injured by the defendant's negligent conduct.4 1 Applying these standards, the court concluded that
the Johnsons' allegations of emotional distress were sufficient to support their
cause of action. 42
The Johnson decision was accompanied by a vigorous dissent,43 which
characterized the Johnsons' alleged injuries as the understandable distress occasioned by the loss of a child rather than as anguish caused by any specific acts of

negligence on the part of the defendants. 44 Condemning the rule adopted by the
251 N.C. 498, 503-04, 112 S.E.2d 48, 52 (1960) ("mere fright caused by ordinary negligence does not
give a cause of action and may not be considered an element of damages"), disapproved in Johnson,
327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85; Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 812, 188 S.E. 625,
627 (1936) ("fright alone is not actionable," but allegations of ensuing "nervous disorders of serious
proportions" will preclude dismissal or nonsuit); Arthur v. Henry, 157 N.C. 438, 439, 73 S.E. 211,
212 (1911) ("mere fright is not actionable"); see Byrd, Recoveryfor Mental Anguish in North Carolina, 58 N.C.L. Rav. 435, 437-45 (1980).
For a discussion of the North Carolina courts' treatment of fright as an element of a claim for
the negligent infliction of emotional distress, see infra notes 81-85 & 87 and accompanying texts.
38. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 303-04, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
39. Id. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97. Specifically, the court spoke to "any emotional or mental
disorder, such as, for example, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, or any other type of
severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so." Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. Recovery for emotional injury to directly injured victims is qualitatively different from
recovery for emotional injury to bystanders. Standards of recovery should reflect that difference.
See infra notes 166 & 172-80 and accompanying texts.
42. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97. In the instant case, both Glenn and Barbara
Johnson were within the generally recognized definition of "bystanders" insofar as their claim was
related to the injury to their child (a third party). Alternatively, Mrs. Johnson's claim could have
been based upon mental and emotional injuries that she herself endured while undergoing labor. See
Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 89 N.C. App. 154, 166-67, 365 S.E.2d 909, 91617 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990).
43. Justice Meyer authored a lengthy dissent that included a survey of standards applied by
other jurisdictions and a critical examination of the court's definition of foreseeability. See infra
notes 44-62 and accompanying text.
Justice Webb dissented separately on grounds that the case represented a marked departure
from precedent, as evidenced by the number of cases overruled, and that the cases overruled were in
fact accurate interpretations of valid law. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 318, 395 S.E.2d at 106 (Webb, J.,
dissenting). Despite the admittedly "arbitrary" nature of the physical injury requirement, Justice
Webb argued that the rule served valid policy purposes by providing a needed limitation on liability.
Id. (Webb, J., dissenting). Justice Webb would hold that the plaintiffs did not state claims for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. (Webb, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 307, 395 S.E.2d at 99 (Meyer, J., dissenting). For an interesting early discussion of
the need to distinguish between these two sources of injury, see Young v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
107 N.C. 370, 382, 11 S.E. 1044, 1048 (1890). See aiso Hancock v. Western Union Tel. Co., 137
N.C. 498, 501, 49 S.E. 952, 953 (1905) (expressing concern that jurors "may possibly confound the
mental anguish naturally arising from the loss of a near relative with that which grows from the
defendant's negligence"); Cashion v. Western Union Tel. Co., 123 N.C. 267, 274, 31 S.E. 493, 494
(1898) (same).

1991]

TORT LAW

1719

court as "overbroad," 45 Justice Meyer criticized the majority for "go[ing] beyond even Dillon's 6 broad approach" 47 without adequate justification and for
failing to provide practical standards or workable restrictions to the lower
courts. 48 Specifically, Justice Meyer expressed strong reservations concerning
the court's treatment of the concepts of duty 4 9 foreseeability, 50 and proximate
cause. 5 1
The dissent interpreted the majority's opinion as holding that "a defendant
has a duty not to cause serious emotional distress in any person who might
foreseeably suffer such distress from proximate negligence. This duty, is limited
only by the foreseeability that such harm may occur."'5 2 Justice Meyer argued
that this theory presumes the existence of a duty without first providing any
analysis of the duty's foundation, 3 In particular, Justice Meyer questioned
whether defendants' alleged negligent failure to treat, thereby causing the death
of the fetus, created any duty not to cause serious emotional distress flowing
54
from the defendants to the Johnsons.
Further, Justice Meyer observed that without more specific restrictions on
the standards of recovery the Johnson decision "stands for the proposition that

no risk of serious emotional distress is acceptable."5 5 This premise, he contended, would be contrary to such well-established axioms of tort law as Judge
Learned Hand's famous cost-benefit equation 56 and would have detrimental effects on the availability and price of social necessities, including medical care
45. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 313, 395 S.E.2d at 102 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
46. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (en banc). For a
description of the Dillon test, see infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
47. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 308, 395 S.E.2d at 99 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 312-13, 395 S.E.2d at 102 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Justice Meyer criticized the court
for failing to establish "any limitations whatsoever on this duty not to negligently inflict foreseeable
serious emotional distress," because "[i]n adopting a rule, it should not be so vague that it provides

no guidance to the judges and juries that must implement it." Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
49. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
51. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 309-14, 395 S.E.2d at 100-03 (Meyer, J., dissenting). For Justice

Meyer's discussion of the majority's treatment of proximate cause, see infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
52. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 309, 395 S.E.2d at 100 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
53. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
54. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 312, 395 S.E.2d at 102 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
56. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting). Judge Hand suggested an equation that evaluates the sensibility
of taking certain risks in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
[Judge] Hand described the duty of an actor to protect against the resulting injuries as
being a function of three variables: (1) the probability (P) of injury occurring, (2) the
gravity (L) of resulting injury, and (3) the burden (B) of adequate precautions. Hand
described this relationship algebraically as an inquiry as to whether B < PL.
Johnson, 327 N.C. at 312 n.3, 395 S.E.2d at 102 n.3 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (construing Carroll
Towing, 159 F.2d at 173).
Justice Meyer observed that "[v]irtually all conduct is risk creating" and argued that the Johnson court failed to differentiate between acceptable and unacceptable risks. Id. at 312, 395 S.E.2d at
102 (Meyer, J., dissenting). He concluded: "Today's decision, drawing no such distinction, stands
for the proposition that no risk of serious emotional distress is acceptable." Id. (Meyer, J.,
dissenting).
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Stating that "the universe of plaintiffs contemplated by the majority's rule is

infinite indeed,"' 58 the dissent also called for more circumscribed definitions of
foreseeability and proximate cause based upon "the relationship of the plaintiff,

the proximity of perception, and the severity of the injury that would give rise to
a bystander's cause of action for serious emotional distress."' 59 These standards
resemble the factors enumerated in Dillon v. Legg, an oft-cited California case
which established the threshold requirements for recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress later imposed by several jurisdictions. 6° Justice Meyer
57. Justice Meyer said:

mhe impact of this rule on the availability of medical care, particularly that of obstetrics,
will be to further discourage qualified physicians from practicing. The risk of liability and
the escalated premium for insurance to cover the liability are already seriously affecting the
delivery of obstetrical care to this state, particularly to the rural areas and to the poor....
I cannot think that our state will benefit from a rule that discourages such risk-taking
activity without regard to the costs society might pay or the benefits society might derive
therefrom.
Johnson, 327 N.C. at 312, 395 S.E.2d at 102 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 311, 395 S.E.2d at 101 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Justice Meyer concluded that
"[l]iability without limitation adversely affects three distinct groups: tort-feasors, the physically injured primary and secondary victims, and society as a whole." Id. at 311, 395 S.E.2d at 101-02
(Meyer, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 313, 395 S.E.2d at 102-03 (Meyer, J., dissenting). For the requirement that the bystander plaintiff have a specific relationship to the victim, see, eg., Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d
644, 667-68, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 880 (1989) (mother of victim is "closely
related"); Elden v. Shelden, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 273, 758 P.2d 582, 586-87, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254, 258
(1988) (unmarried cohabitant denied recovery); James v. Leib, 221 Neb. 47, 55, 375 N.W.2d 109,
117 (1985) (child who witnessed death of sibling could recover; court placed greatest weight on
relationship between victim and bystander and required marital or close familial relation); Gates v.
Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 199 (Wyo. 1986) (limiting recovery to spouses, children, parents, and
siblings for social policy purposes).
For limitations based on the proximity of perception or the plaintiff's location in the "zone of
danger," see, e.g., La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d at 669, 771 P.2d at 830, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 881 (denied
recovery to victim's mother, who was neither present at scene nor aware son was being injured);
Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Haw. 204,209, 532 P.2d 673, 676 (1975) (physical proximity to scene of tort is determinative of liability); Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 Ill. 2d 546, 555,
457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1983) (child who witnessed serious injury to brother on escalator required to prove
that he too was in zone of danger); Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 553, 555 (Minn. 1980) (parents
witnessed severe injury to their child but denied recovery because not within zone of danger); Wilder
v. City of Keene, 131 N.H. 599, 604, 557 A.2d 636, 639 (1989) (no recovery for plaintiff who did not
show geographic and temporal proximity to accident). But cf Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 733,
441 P.2d 912, 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 75 (1968) (en banc) (relief should not be conditioned on plaintiff's location within a matter of yards of accident; case "exposes the hopeless artificiality of the
zone-of-danger rule"). ,
For the requirement that the bystander plaintiff witness a severe injury to the victim, see, e.g.,
Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 100-01, 417 A.2d 521, 527-28 (1980) (severe mental distress not a usual
result when bystander perceives only less serious harm); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 199
(Wyo. 1986) (injury to victim must be objectively severe; court reasoned that "people recover from
serious shock quickly if it turns out to be a false alarm").
For the requirement that the bystander plaintiff himself suffer severe emotional distress as a
result of the injury to the victim, see, eg., La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d at 668, 771 P.2d at 829-30, 257 Cal.
Rptr. at 880-81 (requiring "serious emotional distress"); Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d
559, 570 (La. 1990) (mental distress must be severe and debilitating). The Johnson court required
the plaintiff's mental distress to be "severe." Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
60.' The Johnson factors are comparable to the factors enumerated in Dillon, discussed infra in
text accompanying note 145. Dillon itself was restricted recently by the California Supreme Court in
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"low hurdles" 6 1 and called for
dismissed the Johnson court's requirements as
62
"limits on the class of bystander plaintiff[s]."

The Johnson court devoted a great deal of its attention to an extensive review of North Carolina's treatment of claims alleging negligent infliction of emo-

tional distress. The effects of conflicting policy goals and varying fact patterns
turned what was originally a fairly clear doctrine into a confusing hybrid characterized, the court observed, by "erroneous" and "unfortunate" misstatements of
law.6 3 Because a sequential presentation of the cases would serve only as a lit-

eral illustration of this confusion, this Note orders the discussion of the cases
according to their thematic rather than chronological development." 4
The North Carolipa Supreme Court first confronted the question whether a
plaintiff could recover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress at all in
66
65
Young v. Western Union Telegraph Company. This case and others like it

Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989). The La Chusa court
concluded that Dillon was unworkable; see infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
For scholarly measurements of the success of the Dillon test, see generally Diamond, Dillon v.
Legg Revisited: Towards a Unified Theory of Compensating Bystandersand Relativesfor Intangible
Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 504 (1984) (criticizing Dillon for "using foreseeability to limit compensation in the first instance"); see also Pearson, Liability to Bystandersfor Negligently Inflicted
Emotional Harm-A Comment on the Nature of ArbitraryRules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477, 490-501
(1982) (characterizing Dillon as at least as arbitrary and unsatisfactory as the zone-of-danger rule, if
not more so); Comment, Negligent Infliction ofMental Distress: A JurisdictionalSurvey of Existing
Limitation Devices and ProposalBased on an Analysis of Objective Versus Subjective Indices of Distress, 33 VILL. L. REv. 781, 803-17 (1988) (detailed discussion of many jurisdictions' treatments of
Dillon); Note, BystanderRecovery: A Policy OrientedApproach, 32 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rav. 877, 888-98
(1987) (discussing difficulties encountered by California courts interpreting Dillon).
dissenting). Justice Meyer said the
61. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 310, 395 S.E.2d at 101 (Meyer, J.,
court's implication that psychiatric testimony might be required to substantiate or verify that the
plaintiff suffered severe mental distress was a "totally ineffective barrier" because diagnosable responses to traumatic events are common, and possibly even a statistical likelihood. Id. (Meyer, J.,

dissenting).
For a listing of the various elements often cited in support of medical diagnoses of severe mental
distress, see DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 236-38 (3d rev. ed.

1987) [hereinafter DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL]. See infra note 119 for a short listing
of elements.
dissenting).
62. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 311, 395 S.E.2d at 101 (Meyer, J.,
63. Id. at 294-95, 395 S.E.2d at 91-92. (The "Kimberly opinion was the first opinion of this
Court to characterize, unfortunately, emotional injury as a type of physical injury .... Such mischaracterizations of emotional distress [are now recognized to be] unnecessary and erroneous
terminology.").
64. First, the Note discusses the North Carolina Supreme Court's initial recognition of negligent infliction of emotional distress claims when the claims were coupled with other causes of action.
See infra notes 65-79. The Note then addresses the development of the physical injury requirement
and attempts to clarify the often overlooked distinctions between mere fright and genuine mental
anguish, and the differing standards applicable to each. See infra notes 80-92. The Note also analyzes the cases pertaining to the collateral issue of bystander recovery. See infra notes 93-108.
65. 107 N.C. 370, 11 S.E. 1044 (1890). The Young court noted that the issue was one of "first
impression in this State." Id. at 383, 11 S.E. at 1048.
The Young decision was also the first of many "negligent delivery of a telegram" cases in which
the court routinely allowed recovery for mental distress occasioned by a late or missing message. In
this context, the court stated in Hancock v. Western Union Tel. Co., 137 N.C. 498, 500-01, 49 S.E.
952, 953 (1905), that "[the right to recover damages for purely mental anguish, not connected with
or growing out of a physical injury, is the settled law of this State, and it is too late now to question
it."
66. The cases that first established the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress in North
Carolina generally date to the period between 1800 and 1920. For a comprehensive survey of the
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focused not only on the injuries for which a plaintiff could recover, but also on
the nature of the cause of action itself. Plaintiffs generally brought claims for
negligent infliction of emotional distress in conjunction with other claims, 67 in
tort or in contract. In Young, for example, plaintiff alleged that he had "suffered
great pain, mental anguish, and distress by reason of the [defendant's] gross negligence and delay in transmitting... [a] telegram" 68 that, if delivered, would
have given plaintiff notice of his wife's impending death and afforded him the
opportunity to be with her and to attend her funeral. 69 Confirming that these
mental injuries were indeed compensable, the court cited Cicero's Eleventh Phillippic against Anthony as instructive: "For, as the power of the mind is greater
than that of the body, in the same way the sufferings of the mind are more severe
than the pains of the body."70
The Young court also emphasized the importance of defendant's status as a
public servant and of the duties it owed to the public as a result of that relationship. 7 1 Though plaintiff's cause of action was based in contract, the court also
recognized that the claim was "in reality in the nature of tort for the negligence,
and that.., the plaintiff is entitled to recover... for the actual damages done
'72
him, and that mental anguish is actual damage."
In other early cases alleging mental anguish, the court also routinely recognized a right to recover for mental distress occasioned by negligent transportation or mishandling of dead bodies where the plaintiff was a close relative of the
deceased person. 73 In allowing these plaintiffs to recover, the court frequently
tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress and its development in North Carolina, see Byrd,

supra note 37.
67. For example, plaintiffs sought recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress incon.

nection with missing or late telegraphs, negligent actions by common carriers, negligent mishandling
of dead relatives' bodies, and the negligent termination of telephone services. Byrd, supra note 37, at
452-55 & n.17.
68. Young, 107 N.C. at 371, 11 S.E. at 1044.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 385, 11 S.E. at 1048-49. Cicero, the court observed, "certainly may be quoted as an
authority among lawyers." Id. at 385, 11 S.E. at 1048.
The severity of mental injuries and their genuine ability to incapacitate has been recognized
consistently by the North Carolina courts. See, eg., Hargis v. Knoxville Power Co., 175 N.C. 31,
34, 94 S.E. 702, 703 (1917) ("As all pain is mental and centers in the brain, it follows that as an
element of damage for personal injury the injured party is allowed to recover for actual suffering of
mind and body"); Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 404, 55 S.E. 778, 780 (1906) ("[Tihe general
principles of the law of torts support a right of action for physical injuries resulting from negligence
... none the less strongly because the physical injury consists of a wrecked nervous system instead of
lacerated limbs."), disapproved in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85; Hunter v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 135 N.C. 458, 467, 47 S.E. 745, 748 (1904) (Clark, C.J., concurring) ("[m]ental suffering is
as real as physical").
71. Young, 107 N.C. at 383, 11 S.E. at 1048. The court explained that
[i]n failing to promptly deliver [a] telegram the telegraph company negligently fails to perform a duty which it owes to the sender of [the] telegram, and should be held liable for
whatever injury follows as the proximate result of its negligent conduct. It is not a mere
breach of contract, but a failure to perform a duty which rests upon it as a servant of the
public.
Id. at 377, 11 S.E. at 1046.
72. Id. at 385, 11 S.E. at 1048.
73. Parker v. Quinn-McGowen Co., 262 N.C. 560, 138 S.E.2d 214 (1964) (denying recovery but
recognizing a quasi-property right in the body); Stephenson v. Duke Univ., 202 N.C. 624, 163 S.E.
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that the cause of action [was] based on a quasi-property
relied on the "rationale
'74
body."
the
in
right
In 1916, the court held in Bailey v. Long 75 that a plaintiff-husband could
recover not only the medical expenses he incurred as a result of the defendantdoctor's negligent breach of a contract to provide skillful medical care for plaintiff's wife, but also could recover damages for the mental anguish he sustained

when she died as a result of the doctor's negligence. 76 Bailey suggested that the
underlying contract claim might not be crucial to plaintiff's cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress; in short, it suggested that the tort claim

could stand alone. The court reasoned that "if the husband can recover damages from a telegraph company for mental anguish for delay in delivering a tele-

gram informing him of his wife's illness, he should.., recover for the mental
anguish occasioned by witnessing her suffering and death against the alleged
'77
author of such suffering and death."

A number of decisions that emphasized the related or underlying claims
present in the successful early negligent infliction of emotional distress cases,
however, quickly curtailed Bailey's suggestion that a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim might be valid even without an underlying claim based in
contract or on a breach of public duty. After holding that the basis for liability
in Bailey was a contractual duty owed to plaintiff by defendant, 78 the North
Carolina Supreme Court began to scale back the availability of the negligent

earlier emphasis on the
infliction of emotional distress claim by returning to its 79
presence of separate underlying tort or contract claims.
The physical injury requirement itself was first identified as a valid underlying cause of action in Kimberly v. Howland.8 0 In Kimberly, plaintiff brought an

action for negligently inflicted emotional distress to recover for the fright she
sustained when defendants negligently conducted blasting operations near her
home, causing a large rock to come crashing through the roof.8 1 The North
Carolina Supreme Court observed: "All the courts agree that mere fright, unac698 (1932) (recovery limited to next-of-kin); Floyd v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 167 N.C. 55, 83
S.E. 12 (1914) (same); see Byrd, supra note 37, at 454-55 & nn.120-27.
74. Byrd, supra note 37, at 455.
75. 172 N.C. 661, 90 S.E. 809 (1916).
76. Id. at 661-62, 90 S.E. at 809. For further discussion of the Bailey facts and its significance
in the context of bystander recovery, see infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
77. Bailey, 172 N.C. at 663, 90 S.E. at 810. For a discussion of the many cases allowing recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress caused by a late or missing telegraph, see Byrd, supra
note 37, at 452-54.
78. "The foundation of liability in Bailey's Case was the contractual relation existing between
the plaintiff and the defendant; the action was not prosecuted by a stranger or a third party." Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 125, 126 S.E. 307, 310 (1925), overruled on other
grounds in Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hosp., Inc., 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980),
and overruled in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85. The Johnson court characterized this interpretation of Bailey as "erroneous" and "simply... wrong." Johnson, 327 N.C. at 297, 395 S.E.2d at
93.
79. See Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960), disapproved in Johnson, 327
N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85; Hinnant, 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307.
80. 143 N.C. 398, 55 S.E. 778 (1906), disapproved in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85.
81. Id. at 401-02, 55 S.E. at 779.
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companied by physical injury, cannot be considered as an element of damage."8 2
When the fright became manifested physically, however, the plaintiff could recover for the physical injury; the court held that "the general principles of the
law of torts support a right of action for physical injuries resulting from negligence, whether wilful or otherwise, none the less strongly because the physical
'83
injury consists of a wrecked nervous system instead of lacerated limbs."
The Kimberly decision precipitated much of the later confusion regarding a
"requirement" of physical injury either occurring contemporaneously with the
event causing the emotional distress or appearing as a later physical manifestation of the distress before a plaintiff could recover for its negligent infliction.
The Kimberly court faced only a claim based on fright, not emotional distress,
and allowed recovery for fright only upon a showing that the fright resulted in
some physical injury. 84 In dictum, the court went on to discuss mental upsets
generally, which may have sparked the application of a physical injury requirement to cases for severe mental distress as well as those for fright. Kimberly also
recast the claim by characterizing the mental upset itself as a distinct type of
physical injury, rather than as an emotional injury and an additional, separate
physical injury.8 5 The decision presumably would allow recovery for pure
mental anguish, absent any actual physical injury caused directly by defendant's
negligence, so long as that anguish was manifested in such a way as to prove its
86
authenticity.
In contrast, a plaintiff could recover for distress arising from negligent infliction of fright only if the plaintiff could show a literal physical injury either
occurring contemporaneously with, or as a direct result of, the negligent act.
The differences between mere fright and mental distress gradually became
blurred,8 7 however, and the requirement of an accompanying physical injury in
claims that arose out of negligently inspired fright was attributed to mental
82. Id. at 403, 55 S.E. at 780. The court went on to note that "where the fright occasions
physical injury, not contemporaneous with it, but directly traceable to it, the courts are hopelessly
divided." Id.

83. Id. at 404, 55 S.E. at 780.
84. The Kimberly court confirmed that although fright and nervousness could not themselves
be considered an injury within the court's usage of the term, any detrimental health effects brought
about "naturally and directly" by the fright or nervousness would be compensable. Id. (quoting
unreported opinion of court below). 85. Id. at 403.04, 55 S.E. at 780. For example, the Kimberly court held that a physical injury
may consist of a "wrecked nervous system." Id. Professor Byrd notes that
[p]hysical injury, as incorporated in the rule, is not used in the sense of an injury to a
specific part of the body, such as a cut, broken bones, or damage to an internal organ....
Impairment of health, loss of bodily power, or sickness, without proof of any specific
injury, has been held to constitute a physical injury.
Byrd, supra note 37, at 458.
86. The physical injury requirement originally served as a "vehicle used by the court to distinguish harm of [great] magnitude from less serious interferences which, if a multitude of suits are to
be avoided, everyone must be left to absorb to some degree." Byrd, supra note 37, at 458.
87. See, e.g., Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 507, 112 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1960) (court characterized case as belonging to "category [of] cases of fright, anxiety, and other emotional distress,
unaccompanied by physical injury"), disapproved in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85.
Even when claims for mental anguish are distinguished from those for fright, the mental
anguish claims often receive generalized treatment. "There is a tendency in the decisions to treat all
mental anguish claims alike, and as a result distinctions are seldom made between intentional con-
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anguish claims as well. 88 Eventually, the courts came to apply a "physical in-

jury requirement" 89 to almost all cases involving some form of unquantifiable

emotional distress. 90
By this time, a crucial distinction had been lost. Though the courts later
returned to Bailey's early suggestion that negligently inflicted emotional distress
warranted compensation even when unaccompanied by an underlying claim,

they retained the physical injury requirement. Claims prompted by the negligent frightening of a plaintiff could not succeed without a contemporaneous or
resultant physical injury, the claim itself being founded upon the physical injury.

Although claims for negligently inflicted emotional distress once had been considered qualitatively different from claims prompted by "mere fright," the separation between the two faded away. In Williamson v. Bennett,91 the court held
that "it is almost the universal opinion that recovery may be had for mental or
emotional disturbance in ordinary negligence cases where, coincident in time
actual physical
and place with the occurrence producing the mental stress, some
'92
injury also resulted directly from the defendant's negligence."
Other cases addressed the collateral issue of bystander recovery, as differentiated from a mental or emotional injury inflicted by the tortfeasor directly upon
the victim. 93 In Bailey v. Long9 4 the court allowed plaintiff-husband to recover
95
for the "great pain and mental anguish ... to his feelings and sympathies"

induced by "witnessing the agony and suffering of his said wife,"' 96 when his wife
duct and negligence, or between the determination of the extent of liability and the decision ifa cause
of action exists at all." Byrd, supra note 37, at 442.
88. See, eg., Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 198-99, 254 S.E.2d 611, 623 (1979) ("clear
that plaintiff must show some physical injury resulting from the emotional disturbance caused by
defendant's alleged conduct"), disapproved in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85; King v. Higgins, 272 N.C. 267, 269, 158 S.E.2d 67, 69 (1967) (citing Williamson, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48,
and disallowing recovery absent evidence of "any disfiguring injury"); Williamson, 251 N.C. at 503,
112 S.E.2d at 52 (recovery for mental or emotional distress allowed when accompanied by simultaneous physical impact or injury), disapproved in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85; Woodell v.
Pinehurst Surgical Clinic, P.A., 78 N.C. App. 230, 232, 336 S.E.2d 716, 718 (1985) (explaining that
"non-permanent discomfort (physical pain and suffering, mental anguish and emotional distress)
with no physical injury [is not compensable]"), aff'd, 316 N.C. 550, 342 S.E.2d 523 (1986) (per
curiam), overruled in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85; Wesley v. Greyhound Lines, 47 N.C.
App. 680, 690, 268 S.E.2d 855, 862 (1980) (requiring physical impact or injury in conjunction with
mental trauma or emotional disturbance); McDowell v. Davis, 33 N.C. App. 529, 537, 235 S.E.2d
896, 901 (applying Williamson standard), disc rev. denied, 293 N.C. 360, 237 S.E.2d 848 (1977),
overruled in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85.
89. See Williamson, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48, disapprovedin Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395
S.E.2d 85; Wyatt v. Gilmore, 57 N.C. App. 57, 290 S.E.2d 790 (1982).
90. See, eg., cases cited supra note 3.
91. 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960), disapproved in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85.
92. Id. at 503, 112 S.E.2d at 52.
93. For a discussion of cases involving relational interests or "bystander recoveries," see Byrd,
supra note 37, at 448-452. See also cases cited supra note 59 (listing the major restrictions and
standards applicable to bystander recovery in other jurisdictions).
94. 172 N.C. 661, 90 S.E. 809 (1916). The Bailey decision may be read as bridging the gap
between permitting recovery for limited factual situations in which plaintiff's claim arose from a
contractual relationship with defendant, and more liberal reasoning that focuses more specifically on
the nature of the injury itself, instead of its source. For a discussion of the contractual relationship
in Bailey, see supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
95. Bailey, 172 N.C. at 662, 90 S.E. at 809.
96. Id. at 663, 90 S.E. at 810.
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died from illnesses traceable to defendant-doctor's negligent failure to provide a

habitable room for her.97 The court held that plaintiff could recover not only
the sums he expended on her medical services but also for his own mental
distress.98

The Bailey decision was followed by Hipp v. EL Dupont de Nemours &
Co.,99 in which the court reviewed Bailey and confirmed that a spouse could
recover for her own personal mental injuries caused by a third party's negligent
physical injury to the other spouse.l10 The court limited availability of the claim

to spouses and placed it in the context of damages relating to loss of consortium;
"children or other dependent relatives" could not have access to the claim be-

cause "[t]he wife's cause of action [arose] from the nature of the relationship
10
created by the contract of marriage." '
The court sharply abridged this apparent ability of a bystander to recover
for his own mental injuries, albeit occasioned by a more direct injury to another
person, in Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co. 10 2 In Hinnant the North Carolina

Supreme Court addressed both the general standards for recovery for negligently
inflicted emotional distress and the availability of the claim to a third-party by-

stander. The court held that plaintiff-wife could not recover for the mental distress and "serious nervous shock" she experienced after seeing her husband in a
"broken [and] mashed" condition after a train collision caused by the defendant's negligence.103 The husband died of his injuries, causing plaintiff's nervous
system to be "permanently impair[ed] and weaken[ed]."' 1 4 The Hinnant court
conclusively denied the availability of bystander damages, holding that
[i]n the law mental anguish is restricted, as a rule, to such mental pain
and suffering as arises from an injury or wrong to the person himself,
as distinguished from that form of mental suffering which is the accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for another's suffering, or which
97. Id. at 661-62, 90 S.E. at 809.
98. Id. at 663, 90 S.E.2d at 810. The plaintiff in Bailey was a "bystander" in the sense that the
physical injury negligently and directly inflicted upon his wife caused his mental distress.
99. 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921).
100. Id. at 19, 108 S.E. at 322-23. The plaintiff-wife's husband became permanently incapacitated while working for defendant. Plaintiff alleged that due to her increasing indebtedness and the
despair she felt while watching her husband suffer, "her own nerves and health [were] seriously and
permanently shocked, weakened, and impaired; and that by reason of the physical and mental condition of her husband she still continue[d] to suffer in mind and body." Id. at 11, 108 S.E. at 319.
101. Id. at 19, 108 S.E. at 323.
102. 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925), overruled on other grounds in Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hosp., Inc., 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980), and overruled in Johnson, 327 N.C.
283, 395 S.E.2d 85.
103. Id. at 120, 126 S.E. at 308. The majority of the court's later decisions refused to allow such
recovery. See Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 824, 32 S.E.2d 611, 613 (1945) (Married Women's Act of 1913 eliminated right of either spouse to recover for injury to the other; without a cause of action for loss of consortium, "there is none for mental anguish"), overruled in
Nicholson, 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818; Michigan Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n v. Neal, 194
N.C. 401, 403, 139 S.E. 841, 841-42 (1927) (mother could not recover for her mental anguish occasioned by injuries to her son because damages "too remote").
104. Hinnant, 189 N.C. at 120, 126 S.E. at 308. The claim can be read as alleging a physical
injury, but the court apparently did not find the allegation sufficient.
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arises from the contemplation of wrongs committed on the person of
another.105
As a general rule, the court said, "mental suffering, unrelated to any other cause
of action, is not alone a sufficient basis for the recovery of substantial dam-

ages."

10 6

More recently, in Williamson v. Bennett,10 7 the North Carolina

Supreme Court refused to allow a plaintiff to recover for mental distress brought

on by her fright and fear that she had driven over a child, noting that "this
Court has held that there can be no recovery for fright and anxiety, and resul-

tant neurosis, which arises for the safety and well-being of another."' 0 8
In Johnson the North Carolina Supreme Court took stock of all the confu-

sion and conflict in this area of law and chose to define a plaintiff's ability to

recover by principles and standards of foreseeability and proximate cause without additional limitation.10 9 The holding is arguably in accord with prior North

Carolina case law, insofar as the earliest cases are concerned; however, by discounting several decades of subsequent case law as erroneous or unfounded, the
court adopted a markedly revisionist approach to precedent.110 The court

105. Id. at 129, 126 S.E. at 312.
106. Id. The Hinnant court went on to list a number of exceptions to this rule under which
plaintiffs could bring claims for mental or emotional damages without an underlying or supporting
cause of action; among these exceptions were claims for a breach of a promise to marry, and the
negligent delivery of a telegram. Id.
107. 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960), disapproved in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85.
108. Id. at 508, 112 S.E.2d at 55. The Williamson court denied recovery to the plaintiff because
the mental injury was not proximately caused by any negligent act of the defendant. While the
defendant did negligently collide with plaintiff's car, the injury itself was caused by plaintiff's unfounded fear that she had injured a child; "[iln short, she was not frightened by what actually happened but by what might have happened," and the defendant was under no duty to guard against
such an unlikely reaction. Id.
109. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97. The application of these standards, without
more, has been criticized extensively by numerous courts and scholars. See, eg., Thing v. La Chusa,
48 Cal. 3d 644, 662, 771 P.2d 814, 826, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 877 (1989) (foreseeability "not a realistic
indicator of potential liability and does not afford a rational limitation on recovery"); see also Diamond, supra note 60, at 493 ("It is apparent that the use of a foreseeability standard to assess nonphysical damages often is inconsistent with the kinds of injuries that courts, and society, are prepared to compensate.... [The courts are] not willing to 'open the floodgates' by compelling compensation for all foreseeable mental distress.").
110. Interview with Robert G. Byrd, Professor of Law, University of N. C. School of Law, in
Chapel Hill, N.C. (Oct. 5, 1990). In its attempt to mold its prior decisions into a more cogent and
logical progression, the court adopted what could be termed a "historical revisionist" view, according to Professor Byrd.
For example, the court explained the physical injury requirement enunciated in Stanback v.
Stanback as follows:
While we said in Stanback that a showing of "physical injury" was required, we also
relied upon our earlier statement in Kimberly, indicating that emotional distress is one type
of physical injury, and held that the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim must be
reversed. Thus, the statement in Stanback is, to some extent at least, at odds with its
holding. Further, the awkward two-step analysis of Stanback and Kimberly - by which
we implied that physical injury was required, but then defined emotional distress as a type
of physical injury for which a plaintiff could recover - was entirely unnecessary in light of
the analyses contained in our prior cases which reachedthe same result in a more straightforward and less cumbersome fashion.... [O]ur earlier cases did not require any physical
impact or injury in addition to the mental or emotional injury itself; instead, our earlier
cases simply treated emotional distress as any other type of injury - compensable if the
plaintiff shows that the injury was foreseeably and proximately caused by the defendant's
negligence.
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aligned Johnson with North Carolina's earliest cases on the issue, III and accurately "reinstated" the original principles applied by the first courts allowing
1 12
recovery.
The court contended, in essence, that Johnson is not new law. "While admittedly some of our opinions have suggested contrary results," the court observed, "the overwhelming weight of this Court's opinions for the past one
hundred years leads us to the conclusion that neither a physical impact, a physical injury, nor a subsequent physical manifestation of emotional distress is an
element of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress."' 113 The implications of this view are far reaching. A practicing North Carolina attorney
observed:
Since Ruark held that this holding has been the law in North Carolina since the Hancock decision in 1905, it must be understood that
the holding and reasoning was that this had been our law for quite
some time, despite court decisions to the contrary. Accordingly, every
lawyer handling tort claims must now look into the past to determine

how many emotional distress claims have had life breathed into them
through the decision in Ruark.... My opinion is that there are emotional distress claims which have been revived by Ruark which are
now buried in our "retired" files.
This raises issues of legal malpractice.... If our clients have had
new claims occur because of Ruark, or have had an old claim that we
did not prosecute revived, it is our ethical obligation to review our old
files to the extent necessary and to determine which of our clients have
114
emotional distress claims which now ethically must be prosecuted.
Insurance companies are likely to feel keenly the problems occasioned by dormant claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress if the companies believe
they had addressed and settled the claims of minors or, indeed, any party for
whom the applicable statute of limitations has not yet run. 15
Johnson, 327 N.C. at 302, 395 S.E.2d at 96 (discussing Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 198-99,
254 S.E.2d 611, 623 (1979), disapproved in Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (citations and

footnote omitted).
I 11. See cases cited supra note 65.
112. See cases cited supra note 70.
113. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97. The court suggested:

Such misstatements have led some to believe that an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress may not be maintained absent some physical impact, physical injury or subsequent physical manifestation of the emotional distress, and also that recovery may not be
had for emotional distress caused by a plaintiff's concern for another person.
Id. at 290-91, 395 S.E.2d at 89. This observation probably is understated; see McCain, Johnson v.
Ruark Obstetrics: Land Mine For The Unwary, 9 LML TODAY, Nov. 1990, at 2, 2.
114. McCain, supra note 113, at 2.
115. Id. The statute of limitations for actions based on personal injury is three years, commencing on the date on which the claim accrues. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15 (1983). When a minor is

involved, the statute does not begin to run until the minor reaches the age of 18. Id. § 1-17(a)(1)
(Supp. 1990).

McCain warned that Johnson "also raises a spectre as to whether these insurance companies
will look to their defense counsel for failure to obtain releases of all claims," when the insurance

companies believed they had "bought their peace inprevious settlements." McCain, supra note 113,
at 2.

1991]

TORT LAW

1729

Read literally, Johnson appears to invite a flood of litigation, 116 if the physical injury requirement in fact operated to exclude many cases in the first
place. 117 Johnson held, however, that plaintiffs must allege severe mental distress of the sort generally recognized by professionals trained in the diagnosis
and treatment of mental disorders. 118 Given that such diagnoses in all
probability would depend on the presence of the physical ailments that commonly accompany severe mental distress, 119 the rejection of a physical injury
requirement may have only limited effect.120
Johnson's most significant impact probably will be in the area of bystander
recovery.1 2 1 The Johnson court held both that "the relationship between the
plaintiff and the other person for whose welfare the plaintiff is concerned" 122 is
relevant to the question of foreseeability and that the plaintiff may "recover for
his or her severe emotional distress arising due to concern for another person, if
the plaintiff can prove that he or she has suffered such severe emotional distress
as a proximate and foreseeable result of the defendant's negligence.", 123 Ques116. The Johnson decision sparked a great deal of public interest, to say the least. Johnson was
interpreted as "a ruling likely to increase the liability woes of doctors and enable plaintiffs to win
damages for mental anguish in a variety of cases." Raleigh News & Observer, Aug. 30, 1990, at B1,

col. 2. An attorney for the North Carolina Association of Defense Attorneys suggested: "'What
they may have done is open a Pandora's box for all sorts of tort actions, not just medical malpractice

actions.'" Id. at B2, col. 3.

The criticism of Johnson took on partisan tones as November elections approached; in the running for Supreme Court judgeships were incumbent Justices Exum, Webb, and Whichard. Republican Governor James G. Martin "criticized Democratic judges for being too eager to rewrite state law
and to make it too easy for plaintiffs to win large civil verdicts." Id., Oct. 17, 1990, at B1, col. 2.
News reports observed that "Mr. Martin also has singled out specific decisions [Johnson and a death
penalty case] by the Democratic incumbents and has complained that the court has a liberal, activist
approach to the law." Id., Oct. 18, 1990, at B3, col. 1.
117. Plaintiffs have satisfied the physical injury requirement by alleging, for example, general
"[i]mpairment of health, loss of bodily power, or sickness, without proof of any specific injury."
Byrd, supranote 37, at 458 (citing Sparks v. Tennessee Mineral Prods. Corp., 212 N.C. 211, 212, 193
S.E. 31, 32 (1937) (plaintiff suffered from loss of weight, nervousness, and other ailments); Kimberly
v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 403, 55 S.E. 778, 780 (1906) (plaintiff affected with shocked nervous
system), dissapproved in Johnson, 327 N.C. at 295, 302, 395 S.E.2d at 92, 96)); see also Arthur v.
Henry, 157 N.C. 438, 439, 73 S.E. 211, 212 (1911) (plaintiff "suffered in body and mind" and was
"made sick"); Watkins v. Kaolin Mfg. Co., 131 N.C. 536, 538, 42 S.E. 983, 984 (1902) (plaintiff
became "almost helpless" and "could not go about her daily duties"). But cf Woodell v. Pinehurst
Surgical Clinic, P.A., 78 N.C. App. 230, 232, 336 S.E.2d 716, 718 (1985) (neither nonpermanent
discomfort nor physical pain satisfies physical injury requirement), aff'd, 316 N.C. 550, 342 S.E.2d
523 (1986) (per curiam), overruled in Johnson, 327 N.C. at 301, 395 S.E.2d at 95.
Professor Byrd observed that "[u]nder these holdings it is probable that a 'physical' injury can
be shown in any case in which significant mental or emotional harm has occurred." Byrd, supra
note 37, at 458.
118. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
119. See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL, supra note 61, at 235-39. Post traumatic
stress disorders may be manifested by such things as nightmares, hyperalertness, difficulty in concentrating, sleep disorders, and diminished responsiveness to external stimuli. Id. at 248.
120. Interestingly, the language of Johnson suggests that although expert psychiatric testimony
is not required in order to substantiate a claim, its use might well become the accepted standard.
Thus, plaintiffs could be obligated to incur the additional expenses of psychiatric examination and
testimony, which might also serve to curb any potential increase in fraudulent claims.
121. The dissent contended that Johnson represented the "addition of [a] new layer of liability to
bystanders." Johnson, 327 N.C. at 312, 395 S.E.2d at 102 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98.
123. Id. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
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tions of foreseeability traditionally are reserved to the trier of fact; thus, unless a
claim is so unsound on its face as to warrant dismissal by the trial judge, the case
is potentially assured of reaching a jury.1 24 Prior to Johnson, the "physical injury requirement" served as a clearly defined, if merely arbitrary, screening
1 25
device.
Given the widespread perception that Johnson opened new doors to more
extensive liability, 126 the decision may prompt an increased effort to recover for
negligent infliction of emotional distress and, naturally, a corresponding increase
in litigation. 12 7 Because claims must be examined on their facts, plaintiffs must
overcome few preliminary obstacles.128 Plaintiffs need allege only that a defendant acted negligently, that the foreseeable result was severe emotional distress or
mental anguish on the part of the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff did suffer severe
12 9
emotional distress as a result.
Characterizing Johnson as exemplary of the "[new] policy of this jurisdiction to extend an infinite responsibility to everyone who has suffered," 130 Justice
Meyer noted in dissent that an increase in litigation and a heightened awareness
of liability on the part of service providers, and insurance companies in particular, could impose severe societal costs. 13 1 The danger of escalating insurance
premiums and decreasing availability of obstetric care are valid concerns. In
addition, the risk of an excessive recovery by plaintiffs is real. 132 Damages for
emotional distress are regularly compensated in wrongful death actions, even if
not specifically requested as an element of damages and despite instructions to
124. The court held that "[q]uestions of foreseeability and proximate cause must be determined
under all the facts presented, and should be resolved on a case-by-case basis by the trial court and,
where appropriate, by the jury." Id. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98. As a result of Johnson, plaintiffs who
bring negligent infliction of emotional distress claims may have enhanced bargaining power during
settlement negotiations.
125. As one commentator noted:
[The] so-called "physical manifestation" requirement served two major purposes. First, it
served to limit the potential liability of defendants since a cause of action was only available
in those cases where physical injury could be established. Second, it operated as an ele-

ment of proof that the plaintiff suffered actual mental distress, and thus that the suit was
not trivial or fraudulent.
Comment, supra note 60, at 795.
126. The North Carolina legal community's reaction to Johnson was dominated by concerns that
the case ushered in unlimited liability on the part of defendants. The decision became a popular
topic for various political campaigns underway in October and November of 1990; critics frequently
pointed to Johnson as an example of the need for judicial reform in North Carolina and as a reason
to elect new justices to the North Carolina Supreme Court. See news articles cited supra note 116.
127. For a discussion of the potential revival of negligent infliction of emotional distress claims
that were left unlitigated due to the absence of physical injury, see supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
128. As discussed earlier, however, the severity of the mental distress may be subject to expert
psychiatric evaluation. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
129. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
130. Id. at 312, 395 S.E.2d at 102 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting). See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
132. In his dissent, Justice Meyer suggested that when a plaintiff brings an action for both emotional distress and wrongful death, the claims should be joined to curtail the risk of "inconsistent
verdicts and double recoveries for the same loss." Johnson, 327 N.C. at 314-15, 395 S.E.2d at 103
(Meyer, J., dissenting).
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the jury not to include them. 133 Assuming that Johnson does represent a significant expansion of liability, the financial burden on defendants may be increased
if plaintiffs are permitted to bring negligent infliction of emotional distress
1 34
claims independently of other related claims they may have.
Fortunately, Johnson's rejection of the physical injury requirement will promote more honest pleadings. The requirement originally evolved as the courts

sought a means of differentiating between serious and trivial claims. 13 5 When a

plaintiff genuinely does suffer serious physical effects as a result of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff will continue to allege such factors to
demonstrate the extent of his emotional harm. Such "physical manifestations"
as sleeplessness, irritability, and inability to concentrate, however, have been
found to satisfy the physical injury requirement when the plaintiff's claim was
otherwise valid. t 36 These allegations were often only tangentially related to the
basis of the claim and were included in the pleadings for the sole purpose of
fulfilling the physical injury requirement. Johnson, then, may curb the artificiality formerly involved in alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress. Repudiation of the physical injury requirement should have little, if any, effect on the
risk of fraudulent claims; at the very least, its absence should not increase their
137
likelihood.
The long-term import of Johnson is less clear. By conclusively rejecting a
physical injury requirement and dismissing it as "arbitrary," the majority left
the lower courts with no specific threshold requirements or rules of law by
which to screen claims for validity. The majority reviewed the tests followed by
other jurisdictions1 38 and noted the absence of any "single clear doctrine to
which it can be said that a majority of states adhere." 139 A number of states,
however, reject the approach of the "new" North Carolina standard in favor of
more definitive guidelines. 4°
Illustrative of states that have rejected a standard similar to that established
in Johnson is a recent California case, Thing v. La Chusa.141 In La Chusa the
133. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting). Several supreme court opinions have addressed the possibility of

"double recovery" in light of the difficulties faced by juries as they try to apportion damages between
the distress caused by negligence and the distress caused by the loss of,or injury to, a relation. See

cases cited supra note 44.
134. Because any award for negligent infliction of emotional distress must first be predicated on
a finding of negligence, joinder of these related claims would be eminently sensible. See N.C.R. Civ.
PRO. 18(a); see also C. WILSON, NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE § 18-2, at 356 (1989)

("[Rule 18(a) does not] permit claim-splitting in violation of the common law principle that all
damages incurred as a result of a single injury must be recovered in one lawsuit.").
135. See Byrd, supra note 37, at 458.
136. See, eg., cases cited supra note 117.

137. One commentator addressed the risk of fraudulent claims as follows: "Ifrecovery is limited
to instances where it would be generally viewed as appropriate and not excessive, then, by definition,
the defendant's liability is commensurate with the damage that the defendant's conduct caused.
Further, the judicial system would not be overburdened by administering fair and proper claims."

Comment, supra note 60, at 819.
138.
139.
140.
note 59.
141.

Johnson, 327 N.C. at 288-90, 395 S.E.2d at 88-89.
Id. at 290, 395 S.E.2d at 89.
For a listing of common restrictions applied in other jurisdictions, see, eg., cases cited supra
48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
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California Supreme Court declared the Dillon v. Legg 14 2 test unworkable due to
its tendency to create "ever widening circles of liability. ' 14 3 The Dillon decision
spawned the "foreseeable plaintiff" test, which facilitated recovery on the basis
of "the neutral principles of foreseeability, proximate cause and consequential
injury that generally govern tort law." 144
The Dillon test required the California courts to take certain factors "into
account" to determine foreseeability: specifically, (1) whether the plaintiff was
in close proximity to the scene of the accident, (2) whether the plaintiff's emotional distress was the result of the "sensory and contemporaneous observance
of the accident," and (3) whether the plaintiff was "closely related" to the victim.145 The Dillon test did not call for a physical injury to the plaintiff, but was
otherwise more restrictive regarding the class of plaintiffs eligible to recover than
is Johnson.
In place of Dillon, the La Chusa court set forth a list of requirements that
could be waived or excused only under "exceptional circumstances." 146 The
court held that
a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury to a third person if,
but only if,
said plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injured victim; (2) is present
at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is
then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result
suffers serious emotional distress-a reaction beyond that which would
be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal
response to the circumstances. 147
The court explained that reliance on the concepts of foreseeability and proximate causation was unsatisfactory because "reliance on foreseeability of injury
alone in finding a duty, and thus a right to recover, is not adequate when the
damages sought are for an intangible injury." 148 Significantly, the Dillon test
condemned as unworkable by the La Chusa court held that the plaintiff's right
to recover was limited only by the "general rules of tort law.., long applied to
all other types of injury." 149 The abandoned.Dillon standards are generally consistent with those recently adopted in Johnson.15 0
The Johnson court attempted to rest a controversial holding on undeniable
142. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (en banc).
143. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d at 653, 771 P.2d at 819, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 870.

144. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 737, 441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
145. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
146. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d at 668 n.10, 771 P.2d at 829 n.10, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880 n.10.
147. Id. at 667-68, 771 P.2d at 829-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81 (footnotes omitted).

148. Id. at 664, 771 P.2d at 826, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
149. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 746, 441 P.2d at 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
150. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304-05, 395 S.E.2d at 97-98. The Johnson standard is as follows:

[T]o state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege that
(1) the defendant negligently engaged in conduct, (2) it was reasonably foreseeable that
such conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress (often referred to as

'mental anguish'), and (3) the conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff severe emotional
distress.
Id. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.

1991]

TORT LAW

1733

principles of fairness. Under traditional and certainly well-established tort principles of recovery, any party that shows his injury to be the foreseeable or proximate result of the unreasonable negligence of another is entitled to be
compensated for that injury.15 1 Under this doctrine, the mental anguish caused
by the stillbirth of a child and attributable to the negligence of professionals
entrusted to provide competent medical care qualifies as a compensable injury. 152 Against this precept, however, the courts should have weighed the interests of society in being free from unreasonable liability and in being permitted
to undertake activities that may involve risk.' 5 3 In that obligation, the Johnson
decision falls short. The repercussions of the case range far beyond the limited
holding warranted by the narrow facts before the Johnson court; indeed, the
same standards apply to a mother who loses her unborn child to professional
negligence as to a bystander who suffers emotional distress as a result of an
injury to a third party caused by only ordinary negligence.
The very nature of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress mandates a limitation on the ability to recover.15 4 Standards of "foreseeability" and

"proximate cause" are rarely applied in their purest sense, but traditionally are

tempered by policy considerations and the common-sense notion that after the
reaching of an admittedly arbitrary line, forcing defendants to assume the risk of
liability simply becomes unfair. When the chain of causation is real but nonetheless grossly attenuated, no principles of deterrence may be served, and the
ability to guard against causing injury to another is so negligible as to be reduced
to a question of luck. The experience of other jurisdictions warns that standards
of foreseeability and proximate cause in negligent infliction of emotional distress
cases foster uncertainty:
It is apparent that reliance on foreseeability of injury alone in finding a
duty, and thus a right to recover, is not adequate when the damages
sought are for an intangible injury. In order to avoid limitless liability
out of all proportion to the degree of a defendant's negligence, and
against which it is impossible to insure without imposing unacceptable
costs on those among whom the risk is to be spread, the right 155
to recover for negligently caused emotional distress must be limited.
The need for fact-specific restrictions is made all the more compelling by
the court's assurance that "ordinary negligence will suffice."' 156 Further, the
151. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
152. The Johnsons' claim was dismissed prior to trial, and at the time of this writing no finding
of negligence or other wrongdoing has yet been lodged against defendants as a result of the trial.
153. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). In Carroll
Towing, Judge Learned Hand introduced his famous equation distinguishing those risks that are
worth taking from those that are not. For the text of the equation and Justice Meyer's application of
the principle to Johnson, see supra notes 55-57.
154. This is particularly true with respect to bystander recovery cases that turn on the relational
interest between the bystander plaintiff and the directly injured victim; such situations "create the
possibility of liability to a large number of people .... Under these circumstances the fear of an
indefinite liability is a legitimate one, and the need to impose reasonable limits upon the extent of a

defendant's responsibility clearly exists." Byrd, supra note 37, at 448.

155. Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 664, 771 P.2d 814, 826-27, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 877-78
(1989).
156. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
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court stipulated that the validity of negligent infliction of emotional distress
claims must be determined case by case; 157 however, an ad hoe approach surely
will foster further uncertainty in this area of law, resulting in the disparate treatment of cases. 158 The Johnson court also explained that "our trial courts have
adequate means available to them for disposing of improper claims for negligent
infliction of emotional distress and for adjusting excessive or inadequate verdicts." 159 The court quoted Chappell v. Ellis:16
But it is urged that the principle [of recovery for mental anguish,] ... if
carried out to its fullest extent, would directly lead to the recovery of
damages for all kinds of mental suffering. It may be, but we feel compelled to carry out a principle only to its necessary and logical results,
and not to its
furthest theoretical limit, in disregard of other essential
1 61
principles.

The experience of other jurisdictions suggests that the court is overly optimistic. Dillon v. Legg 162 enumerated specific factors to be considered by the
trial judges just as the Johnson court did, but in practice the standard proved to

be too expansive. The recent La Chusa 163 decision recognized the failings of
Dillon, and spoke to the very hazards that the North Carolina Supreme Court

invites in Johnson:
The Dillon court anticipated and accepted uncertainty in the short
term in application of its holding, but was confident that the boundaries of this [negligent infliction of emotional distress] action could be
drawn in future cases. In sum... the Dillon court was satisfied that
trial and appellate courts would be able to determine the existence of a
duty because the court would know it when it saw it. Underscoring
the questionable validity of that assumption, however, was the obvious
and unaddressed problem that the injured party, the negligent
tortfeasor, their insurers, and their attorneys had no means short of
157. Id. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98.
158. This approach is consistent with the North Carolina Supreme Court's traditional treatment
of negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. Professor Byrd writes that
a tendency exists to view cases involving mental anguish claims on an ad hoe basis, an
approach that the court itself suggested in the Williamson case. Apart from the general
unsatisfactory nature of this approach in deciding important legal issues, it involves a real
danger that the sensible and sound development in the law that has occurred will unintentionally be undermined in later decisions, and the uncertainties that arise out of the Stanback case illustrate this danger.
Byrd, supra note 37, at 468. The "danger" predicted by Professor Byrd was realized in Johnson,
which disapproved both Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979), disapprovedon
other grounds in Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981), and Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960). Johnson, 327 N.C. at 299-304, 396 S.E.2d at 94-97.
159. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 306, 395 S.E.2d at 98.
160. 123 N.C. 259, 31 S.E. 709 (1898).
161. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 306, 395 S.E.2d at 98 (quoting Chappell, 123 N.C. at 263, 31 S.E. at
711). Contra Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 673, 771 P.2d 814, 833, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 884
(1989) (Kaufman, J.,
concurring). The La Chusa court observed that "Dillon's confident prediction
that future courts would be able to fix just and sensible boundaries on bystander liability has been
found to be wholly illusory-both in theory and in practice." Id. (Kaufman, J.,concurring).
162. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (en bane). For a listing of the Dillon
factors, see supra text accompanying note 145.
163. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
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suit by which to determine if a duty such as to impose liability for
damages would be found in cases other than those that were "on all
fours" with Dillon. 64
The Johnson decision suggests that bringing every case to trial is acceptable;

because the case offers no rules or standards by which a claim might be challenged, the effect of Johnson may be to discourage the worthwhile goal of out-of165
court settlement.
Moreover, the Johnson court erroneously elected to recognize the same
standards for recovery for both directly injured plaintiffs and bystander plaintiffs. 1 6 6 The court should have examined the two issues separately and imposed
reasonable judicial limits on claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The court declined to develop viable alternatives to the rejected physical injury
requirement, although other options would permit recovery without opening the
door to indeterminate liability. For example, the court could have held that the

standards applicable to recovery for punitive damages apply by analogy to recovery for directly injured plaintiffs. Further, the court could have used a modified version of the La Chusa test for bystander plaintiffs.
Although imposing meaningful limitations on the right of directly injured

victims of negligently inflicted emotional distress to recover for merely part of
their injuries rather than to be fully compensated is nearly impossible, an alternative does exist. Instead of focusing the standards of recovery on the nature of

the plaintiff's injury, the nature of the defendant's harmful and injurious con-

duct should be determinative.1 67 A standard allowing extensive liability for "or-

dinary negligence" 168 is too easily met; instead, the court should require
plaintiffs to forecast evidence that, if believed, would prove defendant's conduct

to be gross, wanton, or willful negligence. 169 Trial courts are already familiar
with this standard. Indeed, the standards for recovery for punitive damages are
set forth in the North Carolina pattern jury instructions:
[Punitive damages] may only be awarded when the jury finds that the
164. Id. at 655, 771 P.2d at 821, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
165. An alternative argument could be made that the absence of a physical injury requirement
will in fact encourage settlement by making trial more likely, and summary judgment for defendants
less likely. Contra La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d at 655, 771 P.2d at 821, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 872 (discussing
the "problem that the injured party, the negligent tortfeasor, their insurers, and their attorneys had
no means short of suit by which to determine if a duty such as to impose liability for damages would
be found" in cases falling under Dillon).
166. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
167. Interview with Samuel 0. Southern, Esq., Poyner & Spruill, in Raleigh, N. C. (Jan. 28,
1991). Mr. Southern, expressing the concerns of many practicing attorneys, advocated adoption of a
more reasonable limitation to the scope of this tort. Mr. Southern's suggestion: "Plaintiff states a
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress only where the facts alleged in the complaint, if
believed, would give rise to a claim for punitive damages." Id.
168. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
169. For example, suppose plaintiff brings a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
on grounds that she suffered severe mental distress after being "almost struck" by defendant's automobile. "One result: if [plaintiff's] claim alleged that she suffered emotional injury when she was
'almost struck' by [defendant's] automobile which he was negligently operating, she would not get to
the jury. But if the pleadings and evidence established that [defendant] was drunk and doing 80 mph
in a school zone, she would carry her case to the jury." Letter from Samuel 0. Southern, Esq. to
Tracy L. Hamrick (Jan. 30, 1991).
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conduct of the defendant is so outrageous as to justify punishing him
or making an example of him. In a case of alleged negligence, punitive
damages may be awarded upon a showing that the negligence was
gross, willful, or wanton. Negligence is gross, willful or wanton when
the wrongdoer acts with a conscious and intentional disregard of, and
indifference to, the rights and safety of others.
Upon a showing of gross, willful or wanton negligence, whether to
award punitive damages and, within reasonable limits, the amount to
170
be awarded are matters within the sound discretion of the jury.
As a result, the trial courts could apply this standard easily and consistently.
Professor Prosser provides further comment on the nature of gross, wanton,
or willful negligence. He would apply the terms to "conduct which is still, at
essence, negligent, rather than actually intended to do harm, but which is so far
from a proper state of mind that it is treated in many respects as if it were so
intended."' 17 1 This standard strikes a workable balance between plaintiffs' interests in recovering for emotional injury and the simple inability of the average
citizen to proceed through life without ever doing the sort of negligent acts that
will, under Johnson, permit recovery by emotionally injured plaintiffs.
In the area of bystander recovery, the physical injury requirement was
equally ineffective, although the need for a better, more consistent limitation on
liability was apparent. 172 The Johnson court, by refusing to recognize either the
qualitatively different nature of bystander recovery or its very real potential to
foster liability beyond all reasonable bounds, leaves to the state courts a complex
question and no clues to the answer.
The standards recently adopted by the California Supreme Court in La
Chusa are reasonable and fair, and offer a valuable blueprint for liability limitation as it pertains to bystander recovery. At the least, they offer a more sensible
launching point, if the perimeters of the tort are to be redefined. 173 The La
Chusa court recounted the difficulties brought about by Dillon's broad rule and
concluded that plaintiffs may recover damages for emotional distress incurred
during the observation of a negligently inflicted injury to a third person if the
bystander plaintiff (1) is "closely related" to the directly injured victim; (2) is
"present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is
then aware that it is causing injury to the victim"; and (3) personally suffers
170. NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN INSTRUcTIONS -

CIVIL 810.01 (Feb. 1986).

171. W. PROSSER, supra note 151, § 34, at 212-13.
172. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
173. One commentator observed that:
The failure of the common law courts to recognize and utilize their ability to change

procedural rules and to adjust remedies may contribute significantly to the difficulties they
encounter when called upon to expand or contract substantive rights. In such situations
they tend to act as if their only choice is between full recovery or none at all, with the
burden of proof remaining the same as in most other civil actions. The effect may well be
to retard needed reform, to prevent the courts from experimenting with techniques
designed to allay fears of the catastrophes changes might bring, and sometimes.., to
replace old problems with equally troubling new ones.

Miller, The Scope ofLiabilityfor Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress" Making "The Punish-

ment Fit the Crime" 1 HAw. L. REv. 35, 36 (1979).
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serious emotional distress as a result of the event. 174
The La Chusa court would limit recovery to "[close] relatives residing in
the same household, or parents, siblings, children, and grandparents of the victim," unless "exceptional circumstances" otherwise justify recovery. 17 5 The
legal relationship between the parties, however, should be given a more generous
interpretation than that allowed by the La Chusa court. Instead, non-family
members should be permitted to overcome the presumption against their recovery if they can conclusively establish the presence of a relationship between
themselves and the directly injured victim that is essentially equivalent to famil-

ial or marital ties.
The additional requirement that the bystander plaintiff apprehend the in-

jury to the victim while present at the scene of the injury derives from the need
to assure that a bystander plaintiff who recovers for negligent infliction of emo-

tional distress does so as a result of his personal reaction to the distressing event,
as differentiated from grief or suffering prompted solely by sympathy for the

victim. The La Chusa court pointed out that "[t]he impact of personally observing the injury... [is likely to] distinguish[] the plaintiff's resultant emotional

distress from the emotion felt when one learns of the injury or death of a loved
one from another, or observes pain and suffering but not the traumatic cause of
the injury." 176 In a sense, a bystander plaintiff is compensated for being forced
by a defendant's negligence to share in the distressing experience itself. The
requirement does not limit a bystander plaintiff's ability to pursue any other tort

claims that may arise on the facts. 177
In sum, trial courts deserve more than ambiguous "factors," 17 8 although
they should be allotted enough discretion to validate claims brought by the by-

stander plaintiff who may not squarely meet the La Chusa requirements but
whose claim is nonetheless compelling. Insofar as the physical injury require-

ment limited recovery by bystander plaintiffs, as it did by directly injured plaintiffs, the added "protection" of the physical injury requirement was so unfairly
arbitrary as to outweigh any beneficial function the rule might have served.
The Johnson court discredits these concerns and imposes on the trial courts
174. Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 667-68, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 88081. The La Chusa court defined serious emotional distress as "a reaction beyond that which would
be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal response to the circumstances." Id.
175. Id. at 667 n.10, 771 P.2d at 829 n.10, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880 n.10. The La Chusa court
limited bystander recovery to persons related by blood or marriage on the presumption that they are
more likely to sustain severe emotional distress as a result of the injury to their loved one than would
a disinterested witness. The court conceded that "[s]uch limitations are indisputably arbitrary since
it is foreseeable that in some cases unrelated persons have a relationship to the victim or are so
affected by the traumatic event that they suffer equivalent emotional distress" but argued that
"drawing arbitrary lines is unavoidable if we are to limit liability and establish meaningful rules for
application by litigants and lower courts." Id. at 666, 771 P.2d at 828, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
176. Id. at 666 & n.9, 771 P.2d at 828 & n.9, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 879 & n.9.
177. The facts may support a wrongful death claim, for example. For the argument that negligent infliction of emotional distress claims should be joined to related tort claims, see supra note 134
and accompanying text.
178. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98. The "factors" named by the court are readily
understandable, but their relative weight is left undefined. Id.
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the duty to establish new, more meaningful standards for recovery as the tort of
negligent infliction of emotional distress develops. The court offers no reason
why the most relevant limitations are still to be discovered, or why the job falls

to the trial courts. This lack of explanation is particularly disturbing given that
the North Carolina Supreme Court's experience with the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress is extensive. 179
The Johnson court's conclusion that the physical injury requirement operated in an arbitrary fashion is supported on varying grounds. The most obvious

source of support is the disproportionality between allowing recovery for mental
distress damages when accompanied by an insignificant injury as compared to

the denial of recovery for truly severe mental anguish when a plaintiff
neglected
180
to characterize the symptoms of his distress as "physical" injury.

Though the

physical injury requirement promoted a valid evidentiary purpose in that it
helped to distinguish severe mental distress from momentary or insignificant

emotional upsets, its tendency to validate or invalidate emotional distress claims
on unfairly arbitrary grounds greatly outweighed its usefulness. The court
should be commended for rejecting such a rule, but faulted for not replacing it
with a better one.
TRACY L. HAMRICK

179. Justice Meyer observed: "The majority opinion is exceedingly (and in my view unnecessarily) critical of the care this Court has previously exercised in this area. Besides being inaccurate,
these statements do nothing to instill confidence in this Court's opinions." Johnson, 327 N.C. at 315,
395 S.E.2d at 104 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Justice Webb expressed the same view: "I do not believe
the Court of Appeals has been wrong in the way it has interpreted our cases." Id. at 318, 395 S.E.2d
at 106 (Webb, J., dissenting).
The tone of the majority opinion is surprisingly censorious in its discussion of what it repeatedly
identified as miscategorizations of North Carolina law. In light of the court's concession that this
area of law is not clear, its insistence on deciding negligent infliction of emotional distress cases on an
ad hoc basis without any threshold requirements, and its own multiple contributions to the prevailing uncertainty, this posture is unwarranted.
180. The disproportionality of the requirement has often been criticized in scholarly journals.
For example, one commentator noted that "[t]he physical manifestation requirement has been criticized as being overinclusive, in that it permits recovery for demonstrably trivial mental distress
accompanied by physical symptoms, and underinclusive, since serious distress is noncompensable
absent the happenstance of subsequent physical symptoms." Comment, supra note 60, at 801-02.
This criticism has been emphasized by the jurisdictions that have declined to adopt a physical
injury requirement. See, e.g., Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 437 (Me.
1982) (physical injury requirement is over- and underinclusive); James v. Leib, 221 Neb. 47, 58, 375
N.W.2d 109, 116 (1985) (same). For other criticisms of the requirement, see, eg., Taylor v. Baptist
Medical Center, Inc., 400 So. 2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1981) (rejecting requirement because current medical
technology allows assessment of mental injury without reliance on "procrustean principles which
have little or no resemblance to medical realities"); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 159, 404 A.2d 672,
678 (1979) (same; medical advances have "discredited these hoary beliefs").

